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CROSSING THE GAP: 
THE 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION ENGINEERS 
AND BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION 1939-1945 
Bill Rawling* 
(Received 25 March 1985. Revised/accepted 12 November 1985.) 
In the course of the Second World War soldiers saw the increased 
use of technology for air, sea and land forces and their sup-
porting arms. By the end of the war radar, the jet and the main 
battle tank had made their way from drawing boards into the 
arsenals of the warring powers. On land, technological de-
velopments were used to ensure the rapid movement of troops 
and equipment. The German ZlltzkKltQ is perhaps the best 
example of this violent mobile warfare as it set the norm for 
Axis and Allied armies alike. 
The main obstacle to rapid movement over land was not necessar-
ily the enemy's attempts to stop one's advance but the limits 
imposed by geography. Rivers especially could be formidable 
obstacles for a tank column, if fords were few and far between. 
It was thus often necessary to call upon the engineers to pre-
pare crossings, either by filling in the obstacle or by 
bridging across it. The Canadian Army was no exception. Each 
infantry division included in its ranks three field companies 
and one park company of engineers whose task was, among other 
things, to ensure the rapid movement of the division in an 
advance, including the construction of bridges over rivers, 
streams and creeks that were otherwise impassable. 
By studying the engineers of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, 
one can trace the relationship between the sappers, as the field 
engineers were called, and the technology — in this case the 
bridges — they had to work with. Though the division had some 
forty-two months in which to train, certain problems such as 
how to build under shell-fire could not be solved until the 
formation began combat operations in Sicily. The engineers' 
war, then, can be divided into two periods. The first lasted 
from mobilization in September 1939 to the embarkation for 
Sicily in late June 1943. In this time the sappers learned-
the fundamentals of bridge construction and practiced the 
erection of pre-fabricated and timber bridges. The second 
period ran from July 19 43 to May 19 45 and saw the engineers 
applying their knowledge in Sicily, Italy and the Netherlands 
often being forced to solve problems that had not been encoun-
tered during training in England. 
*Department of History, University of Toronto. 
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The men under study here had for the most part brought tech-
nical skills with them from civilian life. Officers were re-
cruited from the universities, engineering firms and also from 
among the ranks. Any non-commissioned officer or man who 
showed promise in the eyes of superior officers might be sent 
to an officer training camp. The men themselves were re-
cruited from among the skilled trades. In the early days of 
the war especially, the engineer companies found among their 
troops blacksmiths, electricians, fitters, surveyors, plumbers, 
carpenters, draughtsmen, artificers, bricklayers, concretors, 
masons and miners. These officers and men had the task of 
applying their technical knowledge and resources to the further-
ance of the division commander's plans. To prepare for their 
role, the sappers underwent military training, such as bridging, 
to augment their civilian knowledge. 
The publication of EvtQlvKizn. Training: Vaut I set the tone for 
bridge training in England where the 1st Canadian Infantry 
Division arrived in December 1939. The book was prepared under 
the direction of the War Office by a staff of Royal Engineers, 
some of whom were veterans of the First World War. It appeared 
in early 194Q and laid out in very precise detail how much 
time recruits, non-commission officers and officers were ex-
pected to spend on various aspects of their training. The 
pamphlet testifies to the engineering complexity, leaving aside 
tactical considerations, that went into the construction of 
each bridge. First, the sappers had to prepare approaches to 
the site and construct abutments. They then had to build piers, 
over which the actual bridge could be laid. Throughout the 
operation the engineers had to apply complex skills like pile 
driving, watermanship and pontooning. EVIQ<LYIQ,<LK T'KOLÂ,n<lnQ: 
PcLKt I allocated six weeks to bridge training, in which time 
it was hoped the engineers would acquire skills that could be 
practiced in England's countryside. The sappers would then be 
able to erect a variety of structures while in proximity to 
Axis forces.^ 
There were several types of bridging fulfilling the same basic 
criteria. They had to be quick to build from parts that could 
be transported on easily-converted three-ton lorries. Each 
bridge after construction had to be strong enough to handle a 
certain minimum load. Footbridges could be very light while 
tank bridges had to be capable of handling thirty-ton loads. 
Finally, the bridge parts and the completed bridge had to be 
rugged. Bridges could be separated into two different cate-
gories—pontoon and fixed span. If the gap was a river or 
stream and the banks were not too high, the engineers could 
build a pontoon bridge which consisted in laying the roadway 
on floating piers from bank to bank. Pontoons were much 
quicker to erect than fixed-span bridges which required 
standing piers. -* There were several types of pre-fabricated 
bridges available, and detailed procedures differed from 
bridge to bridge. Usually, the parts were different though the 
general order of work was the same. Floating bridges were 
built by first constructing rafts and then connecting them all 
together. The structure was then covered with decking to 
serve as a roadway. Details like railings and kerbs were then 
added to the bridge.4 
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Before it was possible to build a bridge, officers and sometimes 
senior NCOs had to gather certain information about the bridge 
site. Also, they had to ensure that the best area possible 
was chosen for construction. These men were thus required to 
check a section of river, to find the optimum site for a 
crossing. Armed with measuring tapes, graduated rods, twine 
and levels the officers checked the height of banks, current 
speed, the nature of approaches on both sides of theriver as 
well as sites for unloading and assembling bridge parts. To 
gather some of this information, reconnaissance parties had to 
cross into enemy territory, making the task one of the most 
dangerous of engineer tasks. When all the information had 
been gathered, the officer prepared a detailed report which 
the commander used to plan his approach. It was from this re-
port, for example, that the decision was made whether to use 
a pontoon or a fixed-span bride.5 By the spring of 1940, the 
Canadian engineers had begun training in pontoon bridge con-
struction. They were, however, plagued by equipment deficien-
cies. At Pangbourne, officers complained that there were not 
enough raft units to build a bridge all the way across the 
river. The situation was worsened by the fact that there were 
no motors for the boats or pontoons. The sappers had to row 
the pontoons into, place, making bridge construction an inor-
dinately long process.*> 
In spite of these difficulties, the engineers leaimed much. 
First, there was the problem of unloading the equipment which 
was carried in lorries specially adapted to carry bridge parts. 
Since it was highly unlikely that a work site would be large 
enough to accomodate all the equipment necessary for the con-
struction of a floating bridge, it was crucial for vehicles to 
arrive in order and be unloaded without delay. The operation 
could be held up for endless minutes under the watchful eyes 
of the enemy's artillery spotters if parts were not at hand 
when they were needed. For example, most pontoons were hooked 
together with pins. If these had been loaded on the wrong 
lorry, work could not proceed until they were found. Such 
embarrassing episodes did occur in these first few months of 
training, exacerbated by the lack of equipment, as lorries 
were not available to practice loading and unloading. Com-
pany commanders relied on the Royal Engineers to lend them 
the necessary vehicles.7 
Once the companies had learned to build the bridge in daytime, 
they began to practice night construction. This introduced 
new complexities into an already complicated operation. No 
lights were used, as these would give away one's position to 
artillery spotters in actual operations. Discipline was 
crucial and only the bridge master was allowed to speak, unless 
a man's safety was in danger. Unloading lorries at night was 
not only riskier, but could easily lead to loss of critical 
equipment. Such problems could seriously delay the completion 
of a task, and the first few attempts at night construction 
often lasted from dusk to dawn where a day build would have 
taken a few hours. 
Training at Wallingford was similar to that at Pangbourne 
but with fixed-span bridges. Two types of pre-fabricated 
117 
bridging were available here in the spring of 19 40. The first 
was the Large Box Girder Bridge (LBG) which as its name im-
plies was formed of box-shaped girders supporting a decked 
roadway. Its maximum load was forty tons. The Small Box 
Girder Bridge (SBG) was quicker to build but could only handle 
half the load. The first problem at hand, as usual, was to 
ensure all the necessary materials were available. As it 
turned out, there was not enough LBG equipment to bridge the 
gap. After a week or so of begging and cajoling by the 
Canadians, the Royal Engineers supplied the missing parts and 
training could begin in earnest. By the end of the ten-day 
bridge camp, a company of engineers could put up an LBG one 
hundred thirty feet long in about six and one-half hours. 
In the spring and summer of 1940 then, the officers, NCOs and 
men of the engineer companies of the 1st Canadian Infantry 
Division were familiarized with the bridge equipment they 
were expected to use once operations began against Axis forces. 
To keep their knowledge up to date, the engineers practiced 
their skills on bridge schemes. These consisted in spending 
several days building bridge after bridge under simulated com-
bat conditions. Success was measured by the amount of time 
it took for the sappers to complete their task. 4 Field 
Company went on such an exercise from 1 to 8 August 1940 and 
their experience was typical. In the course of the scheme, 
the company's three field sections built six bridges, three 
of which were made of Folding Boat Equipment (FBE) and three 
of SBG equipment. A section of sixty men managed to erect two 
hundred feet of floating bridge in three and one-half hours 
and sixty-four feet of SBG in the same amount of time. Other 
sections did as well. Obviously, floating bridges were the 
quickest to build. As the summer of 19 40 wore to a close, the 
Canadian engineers increased their proficiency in construction. 
Near the end of August, 1 Field Company's sections each built 
one hundred feet of FBG in less than two hours; one section 
managed to put the structure up in fifty-five minutes and tear 
it down in forty-nine. *■" 
So far, the engineer companies had used almost exclusively pre-
fabricated bridge equipment in all their construction schemes. 
Such material would not always be available on the battlefield, 
however, so the engineers also had to learn to improvise cross-
ings with whatever they could gather from their immediate sur-
roundings. Improvised bridges were usually made of timber, 
although steel cubes and girders were sometimes available from 
Royal Engineer stores to add strength to the piers or roadway. 
They could not be floating structures because the construction 
of wooden or steel pontoons would simply have taken too much 
time and required the skilled labour of carpenters or molders. 
Because timber had to be cut and notched and each piece put 
into place before the next could be used, these bridges took 
a long time to complete. Engineers constructed such improvised 
structures only as a last resort.11 
Through the fall and winter of 1940-41, the engineers were kept 
busy at other tasks and training. Their knowledge of bridge 
construction was kept fresh with the use of scale models and 
the odd competition. The models, supplied by the bridge 
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manufacturers, were impressive, accurate in every detail in-
cluding such small items as pins and clamps. Thus all ranks 
could review their respective positions and tasks in a bridge 
build while waiting for time and equipment to become available 
for training. The models were only useful for reviewing the 
procedure for construction. In January 19 41 a kind of bridging 
Olympics was held to spruce up the men's manual skills which 
could not be done with models. 2 
In February 1941 a new type of bridge was introduced to the 
sappers of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division. Called the 
Inglis after the man who developed it, the structure was com-
posed of steel tubing, girders and cable and could be built 
either as a pontoon or fixed-span bridge. The War Office 
adopted it because the SBG, LBG or FBE did not share this ver-
satility. Two officers had been sent to Cambridge in the sum-
mer to learn how to build the bridge, but serious training at 
the company level did not begin until several months later. 
It was quickly found that the bridge was not only versatile 
but also that it required little manpower to erect. Under the 
command of an NCO only, sixteen men actually worked on the 
structure, about a one third of the section. This would allow 
the remainder of the section to work on approaches and thus 
ensure the quick completion of the entire project.1^ 
After the introduction of the Inglis bridge, the engineers 
began to experience problems with training. There were simply 
too many types of bridges to remember, and the situation was 
worsened by the fact that recruits arrived constantly through-
out this period. Though the Inglis was obviously superior to 
other types of bridges, there was not enough of them produced 
to replace other types. Also, since priority went to manufac-
turing infantry, artillery and armoured weapons as well as ships 
and aircraft, the War Office could not justify scrapping older 
bridge types because some of them had been superceded. Thus, 
the sappers had to know how to construct FBE, SBG , LBG, Kapok-
Float Foot Bridges, Inglis, Pontoon and Improvised bridges. 
In April, one company had to halt the practice of timing builds 
and begin reteaching the erection drills for various bridges. 
Construction was slowed to a crawl to ensure everyone under-
stood how the work was organized. The same company found that 
training on the FBE Mark III was hampered by the lack of train-
ing pamphlets to use as reference material. These problems 
could only be solved with constant training. Until the end of 
the war, men were retrained on bridge work whenever time and 
equipment permitted.^ 
In April 1941, for the first time, the engineers began to train 
with the infantry in earnest. This was important, for the sap-
pers were expected to support the division as a whole. Various 
aspects of a bridge construction operation were put to prac-
tice with the infantry regiments of the formation. The first 
part of such an enterprise was mainly in the hands of the in-
fantry who had to capture a bridgehead onthe far bank before 
the sappers could begin construction. This was carried out 
using boats and/or assault bridging to effect a crossing. The 
Kapok-Float Foot Bridge, which could be erected in a few 
minutes, was often used on these exercises. Exercise HARE, 
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which lasted from 9 to 11 April 1941, was the first applica-
tion within the 1st Division of combined infantry-engineer 
skills. Each of the three field companies15 detached a sec-
tion to one of the Infantry Brigades to aid in assault water 
crossings and build the bridges with SBG equipment to allow 
follow-up forces to cross in mass.1** These exercises were 
important in that they exposed the engineers to some of the 
conditions they would encounter on the battlefield.I7 
Training, field exercises and equipment maintenance soon be-
came routine. Instructors continued to use models when the 
time or equipment did not allow hands-on training, which was 
carried out when feasible, often on only a few hours' notice. 
2 Field Park Company ensured the equipment was maintained 
while 1 Field, 3 Field and 4 Field Companies tried to keep up 
on their bridging skills. 
In late October 1941 Major Tregillus, an engineer in Division 
Headquarters, was sent to Ripon in central England to witness 
a Bailey bridge demonstration. He was the first Royal Canadian 
Engineer officer from the 1st Canadian Infantry Division to 
see the new bridge, which would eventually become the most im-
portant piece of water-crossing equipment in the division's 
stores. . Designed in 19 40 by Donald C. (later Sir Donald) Bailey, 
a civilian engineer of the Royal Engineers Experimental Bridging 
Establishment at Christchurch, it soon proved itself to be one 
of the most adaptable types of bridging in the world. ° It was 
not until June 1942 that other officers and some NCOs managed 
to examine the new structure, which in sapper lore became known 
as the 'technical wonder of the Western World.' The first 
training build with the new equipment took place on 29 June 
1942.19 
The Bailey bridge was both more complex and more versatile 
than the types that preceded it (see Figures A and B). It 
could be built as a raft, pontoon bridge or fixed-span struc-
ture. Ten-foot-long panels which could be lifted by six-man 
crews supported the load. The roadway, which ran between the 
panels, was itself supported by transoms. These could be 
lifted by eight-man crews. Stringers were placed on the tran-
soms and decking, or chesses, were then positioned into place 
on the stringers. The basic type of Bailey called for one row 
of panels each side of the roadway. These could be increased, 
however, to strengthen the bridge. In Italy, it was common 
to build Baileys with three rows of panels each side of the 
roadway. It was technically possible to build up, thus adding 
stories to rows to a total of three or nine rows of panels 
altogether. It was therefore possible to construct a light 
bridge quickly if loads were not heavy or a heavy bridge more 
slowly if the engineers expected large loads, all with the same 
bridging equipment. Load-carrying capacity varied from thirty 
to eighty tons.20 
Training with the Bailey was interspersed with work on the 
other bridge types. On 2 July 1942 the companies of the 
division began a long, elaborate bridge camp in which they were 
to spend two weeks on each of the SBG, the Bailey and the FBE, 
a sign that these bridges were considered most important or the 
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most difficult to build. As with all new equipment, there 
were technical problems with the Bailey at first. 2 Field 
Park quickly discovered that the jacks used in raising or 
lowering the bridge filled with grit under field conditions 
and ceased to function properly. This could seriously hamper 
work on the structure, as it had to be jacked up and off con-
struction rollers and then jacked down on the bearing plates 
before it could be used. The problem was easily solved, how-
ever, by simply replacing the jacks with something more rugged 
available in engineer stores.^1 
The engineers of the division quic klymastered the intricacies 
of the Bailey. On 2 4 August 1942, 4 Field Company constructed 
no fewer than four of the structures. Class 30 Bridges22 from 
10Q to 120 feet in length went up in two or fewer hours.23 
Bridge training reached a plateau on Exercise SPINACH from 
11 to 22 September 1942. Between them, the field companies 
put up sixteen bridges and operated five rafts. The worst 
disaster of the exercise occurred when 3 Field Company re-
quired six hours to build a fifty-foot Bailey after they dropped 
it into the river. One of the quickest builds was attributed 
to 1 Field Company who managed to construct a 240-foot class-9 
FBE in two hours and fifteen minutes and then maintained the 
structure in good working order as vehicles heavier than nine 
tons crossed. One of the most complicated builds of the ex-
ercise was also 1 Field's responsibility. The structure had 
to cross a fifty-foot gap, an island thirty to fifty feet wide 
and another fifty-foot gap. A continuous span would have been 
too long and tricky to build and the island was too small to 
use as a work site, so the bridge commander came up with a 
complicated plan to complete the project. First, the company 
built a Bailey from the home bank to the island. Then an 
FBE, which was easy and quick to build but incapable of hand-
ling heavy traffic, was constructed from the far side of the 
island to the 'enemy' bank. This allowed the engineers to 
take enough Bailey parts across to begin a build from the far 
bank to the island and connect it to the first Bailey with a 
ramp. The engineers became more and more innovative in their 
approach to bridge construction.24 
In early 1943 the Allies decided to storm the beaches of Sicily 
in July and thus open up the long-awaited offensive against 
Hitler's Europe. Two questions immediately came to mind. How 
would it be possible to get the troops ashore? What do they 
do then? The engineers figured in the solutions to both these 
dilemmas. The doctrine for beach assaults had not been fully 
developed before 1943, when Combined 0pzKa.tlon6 - Royal 
Engineer appeared in March. The book detailed the duties of 
the engineers as the infantry moved across the beaches. At Z, 
the time the assaulting troops hit the shore, the sappers' 
lead sections would accompany them in order to remove obstacles 
through demolitions. Fifteen minutes later more engineers 
would arrive to assist tracked vehicles and trucks through any 
minefields by removing mines so as to form lanes. Simultan-
eously they would search out a series of exits from the beach 
so the advance could continue. Thirty minutes after the land-
ing, bulldozers would arrive to assist the engineers in pre-
paring exits as well as setting up landing areas on the beach 
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for stores and men. Finally, one hour after the initial land-
ing, the leading field companies were supposed to move inland 
to support the infantry and armoured units in their advance.25 
Bridging experience was important both for the sappers who 
moved inland to maintain the advance and for those who remained 
on the beaches to ensure supplies moved forward. While the 
former built bridges over any serious obstacles the brigades 
encountered, the latter constructed fish quays and jetties to 
receive water-borne supplies.2^ 
From April to July 1943 the engineers carried out little 
bridge training because their time was taken up with other con-
cerns. They practiced techniques of combined operations with 
the infantry battalions they would be supporting in the assault, 
and they organized the tons of equipment they would be taking 
ashore to fulfill their various roles in support of the divi-
sion's advance across Sicily. The division, as part of an 
Anglo-American invasion force, landed on 10 July 1943 against 
light opposition and began to push inland; the time for train-
ing was over. 
On 21 July 1943 the engineers of the 1st Canadian Infantry 
Division built their first bridge of the Sicilian campaign. 
The missionforeshadowed the problems both the engineers and the 
troops they supported would have to overcome. The operation 
began when Lieutenant D.D. Love, under cover of darkness, 
managed to get close enough to the gap to estimate it to be 
forty feet wide. After daybreak, a reconnaissance party 
approached the site to get accurate measurements of the gap 
and determine the approaches1 hardness. They were immediately 
driven away by enemy fire from the town of Leonforte, and it 
was evident that the infantry would have to secure a bridge-
head before work could begin (See map). At 2100 on 22 July, 
the Loyal Edmonton Regiment crossed the river in assault boats 
and captured the town of Leonforte. Bridging operations began 
one half-hour later. The forty-foot bridge was in place at 
0200 on 23 July and the first vehicle crossed five hours later. 
The entire operation had taken over two days.27 In training, 
the bridge would have been up within six hours of the engineers' 
arrival on site. Bridges were important to both sides. The 
assaulting troops needed them to ensure that the tanks, 
trucks and supplies they required to fight their way through 
the enemy forces, while the Germans wanted to ensure that the 
bridges were not built so as to cut their enemies off from 
their much-needed supply routes. Technology itself became both 
ally and target. 
The 1st Canadian Infantry Division ceased operations in August 
and the engineers were left to train and rest. During the 
lull, the sappers practiced, among other things, bridge con-
struction to ensure they were at the peak of efficiency for 
upcoming operations on the Italian mainland. 1 Field Company 
set a new record for quick construction by putting up eighty 
feet of Bailey in one hour and eight minutes. Other companies, 
though not breaking any records, managed to satisfy their com-
manders. There were, however, some problems on the tactical 
side of things. Though timings were good, the engineers were 
neglecting some of the crucial steps necessary to build bridges 
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safely. While on exercise or in competition, they often 
failed to sweep the work site for mines or post sentries to 
warn against possible enemy attack. An exploding mine or a 
burst of machine gun fire could inflict heavy casualties and 
bring a bridge build to a halt. Also, the stores layout was 
sometimes confusing, which was no problem when one could stop 
to sort things out but could be devastating on a night build 
when artillery was flying and everyone was nervous.28 Assault 
bridges like the Bailey had been designed to go up in crisis 
situations. Though the sappers could master the technical 
complexity of the bridge, the fact that the Germans opposed 
them with all the means of mass destruction made the engineers 
somewhat more than technicians: they became soldiers as well. 
Tactical considerations could thus be as important as tech-
nical skill when building bridges. 
On 3 September 1943 the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, again 
as part of an Anglo-American invasion force, invaded the main-
land at Reggio di Calabria. Immediately, one of the field com-
panies began to build a bridge just a few miles off the beach. 
This was no easy task. The far bank was actually a causeway 
too narrow to hold a Bailey bridge. Transoms, the horizontal 
girders that support the bridge's roadway, were placed on the 
causeway, in effect widening it. This field modification 
allowed the engineers to complete their task.29 
A few weeks later the engineers were faced with a problem which 
taxed their knowledge even more. It was common in the advance 
for certain materials to fall behind. So it was on 22 September 
when 1 Field Company found itself with a fifty-foot gap and only 
thirty feet worth of bridge. The solution eventually adopted 
was to make two major changes to the construction drills. 
First, the nose was eliminated. This was formed of the same 
parts as the rest of the bridge and measured about half the 
total bridge length. Its purpose was twofold. First, the 
nose was supposed to land on rollers on the far bank so the 
entire structure could be pushed into place. Second, it 
ensured that the bridge's centre of gravity never went past 
the rollers on the near bank. In essence it turned the entire 
bridge into a seesaw. The nose could not be removed until 
the bridge was in place and so left the engineers with spare 
parts. The engineers came up with the novel idea of using the 
parts for the nose in the actual structure of the bridge. The 
solution was to build the whole bridge on the near bank and 
then use a huge counterweight (probably a bulldozer) on the 
rear of the bridge to launch it to the far side. The second 
part of the solution was to eliminate the Bailey ramp leading 
from the roadway to the edge of the bridge, which was normally 
built above ground. These parts could then also be used in the 
structure, though this required the engineers to dig out the 
bank in order to make the bridge roadway level with the road. 
After much time spent in pushing, shoving and praying, the job 
was completed. A total rethinking of established procedures 
had been necessary.30 The incident demonstrated two things. 
First, the engineers had reached a level of expertise through 
almost constant practice that allowed them to improvise from 
first principles when they encountered a problem that had not 
been experienced in training. Second, the Bailey bridge itself 
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was versatile enough to allow such improvisations. 
Some problems could only be solved with sweat and hard work. 
Something the sappers had not had to deal with while training 
in England was the Mediterranean weather. In Italy rain 
quickly turned streams into torrents and roads into quagmires. 
Since a bridge is only as good as its approaches, the weather 
at times became a more serious problem than enemy shells. At 
least shell holes could be filled, but a field of mud and clay 
hadto be drained and paved with gravel. It was not unusual 
for a bridge build to take three or four hours while the 
approaches took a full seven or eight hours more.31 
There were of course problems in bridging that required both 
serious thought and hard work. If rivers were close together, 
as was often the case in Italy, the sappers would have to erect 
several bridges in double quick time for the division could not 
afford to wait as the engineers stopped to roganize for each 
bridge site. As the war progressed, the Germans became quite 
proficient at destroying bridges. The solution adopted was 
the 'bridge gallop.' In November a field company had three 
bridges to build in quick succession. The plan was to slap them 
in one after the other with platoons leap-frogging to their 
sites. 2 Platoon was the first to leave with its bridging 
equipment, completing its task with 3 Platoon looking on. 
3 Platoon then passed over the newly-completed bridge to build 
another with 1 Platoon following closely to erect still another. 
Before 1 Platoon had finished the structure, however, the com-
pany was ordered to build two more bridges which it also success-
fully completed. All five bridges were operating within twenty-
four hours of the order to build having been given.32 
With experience the sappers not only became quick at solving 
new and complicated bridging problems, but also their speed 
in construction increased. A new record was set when 3 Platoon 
of 1 Field Company built a class-30, ninety-foot Bailey in 
four and one-half hours. On 29 November, the same unit reported 
that it had crossed eighteen gaps in five days. 33 
By the end of 19 43 the Bailey and the FBE were the only two 
bridges in regular use by Canadian engineers, the former for 
strength and the latter for speed. Other types were considered 
obsolete or stockpiled for the upcoming Normandy landings. As 
will be seen below, supplies were limited. During a lull in 
January 1944, these two types of bridge were the only ones new 
recruits practiced with during training. One officer said of 
the Bailey, 'Men are quite interested (in training) for to most 
the equipment is new. We all begin to wonder if there is any-
thing the Bailey cannot do.'34 Thus, with fewer types of bridge 
to worry about, it was easier to teach the replacements that 
came in whenever the division rested. Much had changed since 
England, and new recruits had to be taught the innovations that 
the Italian weather and topography had forced on the sappers of 
1 Division's field companies.35 
The bridges that had been built since the landings had to be 
maintained. This entailed the erection of guardrails that had 
not been put into place during construction. It also required 
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painting and marking bridges so drivers would be careful in 
crossing them. This caution was to no avail as trucks contin-
ued to slam into the bridges and force the engineers to repair 
them time and time again. The structures required constant 
attention and became an important part of the engineers1 works 
programmes when the 1st Canadian Infantry Division was in re-
serve. There were, however, some opportunities to learn more 
about the structure of the Bailey bridge during maintenance. 
Such an opportunity arose when, for the first time, a Bailey 
was hit by shellfire on 26 January 1944. It was found that it 
could easily be repaired by replacing some of the damaged 
parts. The Canadian engineers, who had always preferred working 
with the Bailey, were impressed even more by its show of rug-
gedness.36 
Whenever the division went into reserve to rest and train, the 
engineers began to remove bridges in the rear so they could be 
used at the front. This process began in earnest in June 
1944.37 .phe pUrpGse of the work was to recover bridges that 
were no longer in use. As the Allied armies moved up the boot 
of Italy, they captured ports through which their supplies 
could move to the front. Each time a new port was put into 
operation, the lines of communication to its predecessor became 
redundant. Given the scarcity of bridge parts in the Mediterranean 
theatre because of the build-up for D-Day in the summer of 19 44, 
it was considered important to recover the bridges the engineers 
had built in the heat of battle so they could be used again. 
The bridging cycle was thus complete, from construction to main-
tenance to dismantling. 
The engineers were also called upon to solve other, more com-
plex problems. The infantry and especially the armoured units 
asked the engineers to tackle novel problems; meanwhile, the 
officers and NCOs of the field companies had built up a wealth 
of experience that could be directed toward the development of 
new techniques for river crossings. On 1 July 1944, the 4th 
Princess Louise Dragoon Guards, who were involved in long-
range reconnaissance, asked the engineers to design a new 
type of bridge. The structure was completely new in concept, 
for the reconnaissance unit wanted it to be portable. The 
armoured units felt that their missions would be easier to 
carry out if they had a twenty-foot bridge that could be 
carried in jeep trailers. Such a device would allow them to 
cross small rivers and streams quickly without having to per-
form a time-consuming reconnaissance to find a ford, thereby 
affording them much greater mobility in the Italian terrain. 
The bridge only had to be strong enough for jeeps, the main ve-
hicle in reconnaissance work. The engineers came up with not 
one but several designs constructed of timber which would meet 
the needs of the Princess Louise. 8 The engineers then pre-
fabricated bridges for other corps. 
In March 19 45 the 1st Canadian Infantry Division was transferred 
to the Northwest European theatre of operations to join the 1st 
Canadian Army in its march through the Netherlands. As in 
Sicily and Italy, bridges were needed to maintain lines of com-
munication. They were also the subject of the only major 
training carried out in the final months of the war. The 
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Germans were destroying dikes to delay the Allied advance, so 
soon after their arrival in the new theatre f the engineer com-panies went to a bridge camp to practice their skills. Some 
of the results were phenomenal. While training on the Waal, 
1 Field Company managed to build 480 feet of floating bridge 
in little more than an hour. Though floating bridges were 
easier and quicker to build then fixed-span bridges, the 
company's speed was unprecedented.39 4 Field Company took 
four and one-half hours to complete the same length of 
bridge. 40 Training ended on 4 April. Though not all the units 
repeated 1 Field Company's incredible build, their level of 
ability was very high. Five years of training and experience 
in England and the Italian campaign had honed their skills. 
Bridge equipment was complex and required time to master. By 
1945 technical and tactical questions related to bridges were 
familiar to the sappers. Hands-on training and experience 
were necessary for them to reach their late-war level of ex-
pertise. 
The floating bridge training was put to the test during Operation 
CANNONSHOT, in which the engineers demonstrated their exper-
ience and proficiency. The operation was supposed to push 
troops across the River Ijssel and cut off elements of the German 
25th Army. Planning began on 5 April, with reconnaissance 
patrols beginning on the 7th. Crossing sites were chosen the 
following day and the operation began on the 11th. The divi-
sion's objective was the town of Apeldoorn and all its engineer 
companies were involved in the crossing. On the face of it, 
the battle looked like a well-conducted exercise.41 
The reconnaissance patrols carried out by the engineers re-
minded them of bridge camp where of course there is no enemy 
to deal with. The division was opposed by a paratroop training 
battalion reinforced with naval troops. Neither seemed in-
terested in doing harm to the reconnaissance parties. One of 
the company diarists was pleasantly surprised. 'A new type of 
battle this is - when recce parties can prowl about in the open 
on a river bank and not be shot at from the far bank.'42 This 
first phase of the operation was similar to most training ex-
ercises, where the worst danger was falling into the river. 
Tactical considerations lost much of their importance and the 
engineers could place more emphasis on technical matters. 
The actual assault was somewhat more hazardous. In 1 Company's 
area of responsibility, the infantry crossed in amphibious 
Buffaloes at 1630 and had captured a bridgehead within ninety 
minutes. Meanwhile, the engineers worked on the construction 
of a raft to bring up the tank support. It was not completed 
until 2100 because enemy artillery was firing air bursts, 
which spread glowing hot shrapnel over the entire site. The 
company also built a mine boom in case the Germans should float 
mines down the river to sink the heavily laden ferries. The 
operation was a success and the company crossed to the other 
side on the afternoon of the 12th.43 
The mission given to 3 Field Company was somewhat different. 
Four sections were to go with the assaulting infantry to pre-
pare exits for the Buffaloes ferrying troops across. The 
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remaining engineers from the company would then cross, sweep 
a path on the far side and prepare an exit for the bridge 4 
Field Company was supposed to build.44 There was little oppo-
sition to the assault and all went according to plan. The 
diarist described the operation as a 'textbook crossing.' As 
with 1 Field's operation, 3 Field's was carried out with little 
difficulty and no fatalities.45 
Finally, there was 4 Field Company's mission which was the 
construction of a 360-foot floating bridge which infantry, 
armoured elements and 3 Field Company were supposed to cross. 
The unit worked under heavy fire but sustained only two minor 
casualties. Beginning at 1800 they completed construction of 
the bridge at 2230. After the division had moved on, 3 Platoon 
remained behind to maintain the crossing. The operation was 
completed without serious delays.4** 
The engineers of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division had 
learned long before how to work under artillery fire while 
building bridges to span the raging gorges and ragged gullies 
of Italy. They could judge artillery and determine whether it 
was truly effective by listening to the fall of shot. If the 
incoming shells were not a serious threat, the sappers carried 
on with their work even though artillery fire whistled and 
exploded seemingly only yards away. Only battle-hardened 
troops could carry on in this manner. 
After the operation the division moved on. Its lines of com-
munication were limited, however, to what the engineers had put 
across the Ijssel. This meant that all supplies had to cross 
either on the floating bridge which could carry only nine tons, 
or the raft which was capable of hauling forty tons but took 
time to cross the river. These crossings were under much pres-
sure as a result and so it was decided to build a Bailey bridge 
to allow the faster movement of supplies. The engineers con-
tinued to improve the division's lines of communications long 
after the infantry, armour and artillery had moved forward, 
giving the front depth.47 
The next assault water crossing operation came as something 
of a surprise to the engineers but served to demonstrate their 
ability to prepare for work on very short notice. Captain 
Bailey, the Acting Officer Commanding of 1 Field Company, 
was roused from his sleep at 0445 on 17 April with the news 
that the Royal Canadian Regiment was crossing the Apeldoorn 
canal. On short notice, the company built a first bridge 
across the canal by 0740 and a Bailey bridge in the town by 
1100. The "unit then crossed and followed the infantry, re-
moving obstacles to the advance. With little or no prepara-
tion, the engineers of the company had thus managed to carry 
out a complete bridging task. The engineers were beginning 
to show an impressive adroitness.48 
For the engineers of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, 
Apeldoorn was the last bridging operation of the war. On 
7 May 1945 the Germans surrendered unconditionally, and the 
sappers were put to work dismantling some bridges while 
strengthening others for peacetime traffic. In the course of 
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some five years and more, the officers, NCOs and men of the 
field companies had learned much about the complicated task of 
constructing bridges and near the end of the war had become 
experts. In studying their trials, tribulations and accom-
plishments, one comes to realize how complex bridging opera-
tions could be. In the course of learning what to do with the 
new technology, some bridges were dropped in the river, others 
floated away and still others remained uncompleted. Even-
tually drills were developed, new techniques improvised and 
procedures seriously altered — and experience proved the 
master. 
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